eating his subject into a caricature that, although based on some truth, is largely a fictional invention.
Rosen's book is difficult to summarize. It is a collection of previ ously published articles that were put together in a poorly integrated book. As a result, there are many repetitions and contradictions throughout. In fact, one can trace the development of the author's thought on some issues because .it is obvious that the articles were written over a considerable span of time with various temperaments and orientations. Rosen seems to have added a paragraph to the be ginning of each chapter in an attempt to draw a common thread be tween the various sections of the book. But it is clear that these begin nings are forced upon the text in an attempt to convince the reader of a systematic project and a thematic continuity that does not exist. While the reader might possibly accept that eleven of the twelve chap ters of the book are reflections on the anthropology of law, the last chapter, which deals with Muslims in American courts, is at best tan gential to the narrative of the book.
There are many methodological and factual errors in The Justice of Islam, but I will be able to address only some of them. I will also avoid dealing with problems that do not directly pertain to the author's sub stantive arguments. But, at the outset, I feel compelled to note that Rosen's book does not inspire much confidence. He gets the translit eration of many Arabic words wrong, confuses colloquial with classical Arabic,2 and fails to consult or cite practically any primary sources on Islamic law. Nearly, all his knowledge of text-based Islamic law is de rived from secondary sources. As I demonstrate below, there is no clear research methodology to this book. Rosen is prone . to reaching what seem like culturally based conclusions and then, working back wards, he tends to cite anything that he believes supports his argu ments. Depending on his conclusions, he cites the Qur'an, secondary sources on classical Islamic law, reports attributed to the Prophet Muhammad, contemporary Middle Eastern law, his own anthropo logical research, and even anecdotal stories conveyed by friends. There is, however, no clear and systematic methodology in his utiliza tion of these sources. What seems to dictate Rosen's reliance on one source or another is a largely selective -even opportunistic -system of citation in support of his arguments about Muslim and Arab cul ture.
2. Among the Arabic words that Rosen transliterates incorrectly are the following: 'udul (p. 8); muhtasib (p. 8); as/ (p. 22); shadh; fi tna (p. 26); hudud (p. 50); sadaq (p. 15); damin (p. 180); qadhf (p. 191 ); zu/m (p. 156); wasta; and hadana. I suspect that Rosen's Moroccan spoken Arabic is adequate, but, judging from the many mistakes he commits, it is likely that his command of classical Arabic is weak. Importantly, Islamic and Moroccan law texts are written in classical Arabic. It is difficult to imagine that a scholar can speak authoritatively on classical Islamic law or modem Moroccan law without having a firm command of classical Arabic.
The main thesis of Rosen's book is that justice in Islam does not focus on equality, but on equivalence. Islamic law is embedded in a highly negotiable culture in which Muslims bargain for equivalence. In this context, the status or role of persons, much more than facts, plays the pivotal role in law and adjudication. Islamic law is inseparable from its cultural context -a context that is not so much concerned with rules and determinable results, but with conducible obligations, and a dynamic process of social bargaining. Rosen contends that the Arab bazaar offers the best model for understanding Islamic justice and law. The bazaar is an active and dynamic place where there is con stant haggling, bargaining, and shifting alliances. While it appears that the bazaar is messy and perhaps chaotic, in fact there is a cultural con text that makes the bazaar functional and logical. It is, to use Rosen's expression, "ordered anarchy" (p. 143) . .If one understands the par ticularity of culture, the bazaar will cease to be so alien, strange, or ir rational. In this context, Rosen makes the important observation that Islamic law is far more flexible and malleable than is commonly as sumed. In fact, Rosen argues that Islamic law is similar in some impor tant respects to the common law system, but with some important dif ferences that he sets forth in his book.
In its broadest sense, Rosen's argument is sensible and even con vincing: Islamic law has often been stereotyped as a rigid and inflexi ble system of law that is disembodied from any cultural context, seen primarily as a text-based speculative system of law that has little to do with the sociological practices of its adherents. Rosen, on the other hand, considers Islamic law to be thoroughly context based and cul turally bound. Far from being a rigid and nonresponsive system, it en gages the cultural paradigms of its adherents in an active and dynamic fashion.
Much of Rosen's conclusions seem to be based on his observations of court proceedings over a number of years in the Moroccan city of Sefrou. Sefrou is an old but small city of about 70,000 people that is to the south of Fez (p. 4) . From his fieldwork in this small city, Rosen generalizes about the nature of Islamic and Arab justice throughout the ages and across the Arab world. He realizes, however, that consid ering the broadness of his claims, this is an inadequate study sample.3 Therefore, Rosen cites and discusses classical Islamic law doctrines, the Qur'an, traditions attributed to the Prophet, and some contempo rary Arab law codes in support of his arguments. Nevertheless, he does not attempt to explain the ways in which it can be said that the text of the Qur'an, for instance, is representative of anything in con- [Vol. 100:1421 temporary Arab culture. He does not explain the relationship between classical Islamic law doctrines and modern cultural practices, or even the ways that the various . and divergent existing Arab cultures can be said to be Islamic or not Islamic. Furthermore, he does not seem to distinguish between urban or rural, rich or poor, coastal or inland, secular or temporal cultural contexts. Rather, Rosen is quite prone to lump the complex and diverse realities of Arab and Islamic cultures into one indistinct mass of negotiability; and bazaar-like existence.4 But using Rosen's own categories, one can say that there is no bazaar rather, there is a suq (marketplace), and there is no single type of suq in the Islamic or Arab world, but many varied and diverse suqs. In Cairo alone, for example, there is the suq that one might find next to the Azhar University in Asbakiyyah, which serves the students of the theological seminary; there is also the suq that caters . primarily to Western tourists in Khan al-Khalili; there is also the suq that caters to the middle class in the Tahrir area; and the suq in Bulaq that serves a clientele of impoverished communities. Each one of these markets has its own culture and system of conduct that is not generalizable to the other. Most importantly, these various markets are not simply reflec tive of a broad category that we can call Islamic justice, but are the product of a variety of influences, including ·some ·inherited Islamic values, particular localized Egyptian practices, modern commercial regulations, and Western and international commercial influences.
On numerous occasions in his book, Rosen makes remarkably sweeping generalizations about the nature of Arab and Islamic cul ture, often in a fashion that borders on the incredulous. In many ways, Rosen posits himself as the see-it-all, know-it-all anthropologist who can dive unfettered to the depths of the Arab mind and reality and in form the readers, and probably Arabs themselves, about the true na ture and thought of these people that he labels as Arabs. In addition, Rosen assumes that anything Islamic is also Arab, and that anything Arab is also Islamic, so that if he observes what he believes to be a cul tural orientation in a particular Arab setting, he is quick to generalize from that specific context to the whole of the Islamic legal tradition. But even more, some of his generalizations are inexplicably offensive and, in fact, his attempt to pretend that these generalizations allow a greater sympathy and understanding of Arab culture is disingenuous, at best. Although he consistently professes deep sympathy with Arabs and Muslims, the ultimate image that he constructs is largely unflat tering.
There are so many examples of these generalizations that it is im possible to adequately cite or discuss all or even most of them. There" 4. Ironically, Rosen criticizes other scholars for indulging in broad generalizations about diverse cultures, but Rosen's own generalizations are equally problematic. 60. fore, I will survey only some of Rosen's broad generalizations about Moroccans, Arabs, Muslims, and, ultimately, Islamic law. In order to adequately preserve Rosen's style and accurately reflect his claims, I will quote extensively from his book rather than paraphrase his argu ments.
Rosen contends that truth in Islamic law is relative and contingent. Truth depends on the context of interpersonal relationships in which people bind each other through a dynamic of reciprocal obligations. According to Rosen, " [f] or Moroccans, no utterance can by itself cre ate a binding obligation" (p. 7). Indeed, mere expressions mean noth ing unless "something more has happened,'.' in the sense that people have acted in such a way as to create a sense of obligation (p. 7). Rosen goes on to explain that for Arabs, mere utterances imply noth ing about the truth of what is being asserted. Rather, for them truth is constructed within the context of interpersonal obligations (p. 7). · Similarly, promises are meaningless unless validated by practice. Ac cording to Rosen, "in the Arab world ... mere utterances, once vali dated by recognizable means, are taken very seriously, as validated ut terances, [and] become vital to a person's reputation and consequences in the world" (p. 149). From this, Rosen pronounces a whole host of generalizations about the nature of truth, trust, and words in the Arab world. "In the Moroccan view," Rosen asserts, "one can identify and assess a person, an utterance, or an act only by their consequences in the world of human relations" (p. 28). "For the Arabs," Rosen adds, "it also follows that what matters in evaluating actions is not their connection to a series of abstract propositions that lie behind them but to the consequences that actions have in the world ... " (p. 72). Similarly, Rosen elaborates by noting that, "for Arabs it is well understood that an assertion of relationship, standing as a bare utterance, is not necessarily subject to evaluation in truth terms at all" (p. 72). Rosen is then able to identify a maj or difference between Arabs and Westerners. He proclaims: "Unlike the West, where time reveals the truth of persons, in the Arab world it is rather, nested bonds of obligation -like some elaborate map, or diagram of an electrical system -that shows where another is located in social space and what forces keep a person attached, consequent, identified" (p. 41).
Interestingly, one of the things that Rosen cites in support of his argument is an analysis of the word haqq (normally, translated as right or truth) in Arabic. Rosen claims that the word haqq has a variety of interconnected meanings -it can mean a right, duty, truth, reality, and obligation. Rosen then comes to the startling conclusion that this word in one context can mean 'you are right' and in another, 'you are wrong' (p. 6). In reality, however, Rosen's claim that, depending on context, this word can mean the opposite of right, is entirely without foundation. But Rosen wants to prove that for Arabs, all rights and all truth are relative. Hence, Rosen states: "the Arabs operate through a social and contractual system which is radically relativized, one in which permissible relationships are those one can manage to construct within operational parameters that are themselves subject to modifica tion as one marshals one's capabilities to make them hold swaf' (p. 143). Arabs, Rosen contends, live in "ordered anarchy" (p. 143). But, according to Rosen, Arabs find a sense of security and comfort in this ordered anarchy. He states: "For Arabs, who believe that it is con texts of relationship, not invariant capabilities, that most fully define a person, actively entangling them in webs of indebtedness constitutes the greatest predictability and security that one can have for their ac tions towards oneself" (p . . 136). Rosen does not hesitate, however, to claim that there is "a . sense of ambivalence inherent in virtually any relationship and stance in Arab culture," as the Arabs engage in con stant balancing accommodations as to all social or legal realities (p. 158). Rosen deems himself capable to evaluate the subjective con victions that Arabs have about life, and so he asserts: "Arabs believe that social life is a running imbalance of obligations but that it is not the imbalance that applies at any given time that matters but whether the process by which the moving sets of relationships are themselves formed has become unhinged" (p. 172). Arab life consists of ongoing negotiation and balancing, and so there is a persistent state of relativ ism and ambiguity. For Arabs, truth is in the process, not the facts, but Rosen concludes: "It is here,-fraught with all the ambivalences atten dant upon it, that the Arabs have made their cultural home" (p. 150).
Rosen does not in. any way distinguish between Moroccans, Arabs, Muslims, or Islamic law. The existence of a particular characteristic in one is generalizable to the other -in Rosen's mind, they are all one indistinct mass. Having argued that ambivalence is the cultural home of Arabs, Rosen extends his analysis to an evaluation of the meaning of justice and rights for Muslims and Islamic law. Not surprisingly, Rosen argues that, like their understanding of truth, for Arabs, justice and rights are highly contextual, and relative as well. Arabs try to achieve equivalence by taking into consideration the status of a person in the context of. reciprocal obligations and duties. "When Arabs speak about justice," Rosen informs us, "they invariably connect it with the idea of the just person ... " (p. 155). But the just person is not an abstract idea; he/she is someone who is able to interact with his/her context without disrupting it. In fact, Rosen asserts: "For Arabs jus tice ... is not an absolute, a set of propositions to which the insightful must penetrate and give expression in the world" (pp. 170-71). Rather, justice depends on the results of acts, and acts are evaluated in terms of their efficacy for the social order, and not in terms of absolutes (p. 171). Hence, according to Rosen, Arabs either do not understand or are not interested in abstract principles of justice because they are only interested in the concrete results on the ground. Importantly, however, the results on the ground are not evaluated by reference to some abstract moral standard, but simply by reference to the impact that behavior has on the social order. According to Rosen, "Muslim judges characteristically insist that their goal is to get people back into working relationships -contentious as they may be -rather than to solve matters in a way that ignores future ties" (p. 41). Muslim judges do not uphold the principle, or even the technicalities of law; they up hold the social order. Having set the grounds in such a fashion, Rosen is able to conclude that Arabs have no notion of abstract rights. "To many Muslims," he states, "courts can no more be expected to pre serve individual rights than might be expected in life at large -nor be any less corrupt or any more wise" (pp. 74-75). Rosen then concludes: "One only has rights, the Arabs say, to the extent that one can enforce them" (p. 80).
Rosen's analysis on justice has some very concrete implications. Not only do Arabs not believe, or even understand absolute notions of truth, justice, or rights, but even corruption and bribery have very dif ferent meanings in the Arab context. According to Rosen, bribery is not corruption in Arab and Muslim culture. Corruption for Arabs is the failure to share the benefits with the individuals with whom one has formed bonds of interdependence. Therefore, bribery is corrup tion only if it results in privileging an elite. As long as government of ficials are accepting bribes from everyone, and not discriminating against a particular group by refusing to take its moriey, then bribery is not a problem. Consequently, Rosen asserts that in the Arab world: "It is ... as a deep expression of the centrality of justi�e as regulated reciprocity that corruption can be defined as the failure to share with one's network of co-dependants" (p. 163). Importantly, Rosen be lieves that he is not only describing the cultural practices of Arabs, but that he is also describing the nature of Islamic law. Islamic law, ac cording to Rosen, is not found in law books, but in the cultural prac tices of Arabs. As proof of this, Rosen claims that, "Islamic law em braces the culture quite directly." Rosen explains that this is the case because: "Muslims consistently say that their customs do not stand apart from or alongside Islamic law; rather, they see their customs as Islamic law, provided they do not contravene a clear Quranic precept" (p. 57; emphasis in original). What is most distinctive about Rosen's discourse is its unrestrained nature. While on several occasions he criticizes other scholars for essentializing and stereotyping Arabs, Muslims, and Islamic law, he himself does not show any restraint in this regard. [Vol. 100:1421 Rosen, however, can be a sophisticated researcher who, at times, displays glimpses of real insight. For example, Rosen goes so far as to remind his readers that: "Characterizations of justice in other cultures often reveal more about the analyst than the society under considera tion" (p. 153). This serves as a warning to analysts not to project their own subjectivities and biases upon the culture under study. Yet, in practice, this is a warning that Rosen does not heed, and as a result, many of his generalizations are difficult to understand or even excuse. So, for instance, at one point Rosen claims the following: "And every one in Morocco, however well or poorly educated, has a firm grasp of the essentials of inheritance law, particularly as it relates to women re ceiving one-half the share granted men of similar genealogical distance from the deceased" (pp. 89-90). I am not sure how Rosen knows this -he does not claim to have interviewed every single Moroccan, edu cated or not, about the essentials of inheritance law. In fact, he, him self, does not display any particular competence in understanding the essentials of Islamic or Moroccan inheritance law. There is a consider able amount of debate in Islamic law regarding how to assess genea logical distance, and there are a variety of scenarios in which a female inherits the same amount as a male of identical or even greater ge nealogical distance. For example, according to several schools of thought, the female spouse would inherit a greater share than the sur viving male sibling of the deceased.5 This would be clearly inconsistent with Rosen's characterization regarding the essentials of Islamic in heritance law. On another occasion, in support of his argument that Arabs think of justice only in terms of the just person, Rosen states: "In Morocco, as throughout the Arab world, people will often refer to certain individuals as 'the notables of the area' (a'yan al-bi/ad)" (p. 19). Rosen goes on to explain that such notables have a special status, and perform an important role in the administration of justice. Importantly, however, Rosen's claim is entirely without foundation. The expression a'yan al-bi/ad is most often used in rural areas in which the individual is not anonymous, and in which traditional structures of power continue to exist. For instance, in the large and amorphous halls of justice in Cairo or Damascus, the so-called notables play no role in the administration of justice. If a rich, powerful, or politically con nected person exercises undue influence upon a Cairo or Damascus judge, this is called corruption, and is, in fact, prohibited by a host of criminal codes. Similarly, although Rosen insists that bribery is not corruption in the Arab world as long as it does not result in privileging an elite, he fails to acknowledge that both in Islamic law and the leg islation of most Arab countries, rishwah (bribery) is a crime punish able by law.6 While bribery and corruption are a reality in many un derdeveloped countries, the fact remains that they are considered a crime, and that any person who has practiced law in countries such as Morocco, Egypt, Kuwait, Syria, Jordan and others will attest to the fact that prisons are full of people convicted of the crime of giving or receiving a bribe. But my point here is not to quibble with Rosen over the facts. Rather, I am pointing out that Rosen formulates caricatures of Moroccans, Arabs, Muslims, and Islamic law that are offensive, and that ought not to pass for scholarship. As a further example of this caricatured image that Rosen constructs, in describing a fairly chaotic scene of a Moroccan court in Sefrou, he explains that the litigants of ten shqut over each other, and that the court's clerk tries to quiet peo ple down by trying to pin down their hands. Rosen adds that the clerk does .so, "in the certain knowledge that no Moroccan can speak if his hands are not free ... " (p. 11). Perhaps, it is beside the point to note that a court scene in Cairo or Kuwait City would be very different. In urban centers, rules of procedure and the whole decorum of perform ance would be very different from what Rosen has apparently wit nessed in Sefrou. Perhaps, it is also beside the point to note that the type of chaotic proceedings Rosen describes would be similar to what takes place in a small claims court in New York City or Los Angeles. It is more pertinent that one has . no idea how Rosen manages to assess the so-called certain knowledge of the court clerk, or how Rosen man- In fact, many classical jurists went one step further, and argued that in order to avoid undue influence, judges should not accept compensation for their · job. lbn Abi al-Damm writes that where someone is obligated to serve in the office of qadi, he is not permitted to take any compensation for his services unless he is poor. However, even if he is poor, any and all compensation is to come from the public treasury (bayt al-ma/) and not the parties to a dispute themselves. If he voluntarily assumes the judgeship, he may receive payment, although this is not to be pre ferred. Various classical discourses clearly suggest a desire to avoid even the appearance of impropriety. [Vol. 100:1421 ages to evaluate the expressive abilities of all Moroccans. What is far more pertinent is the fact that what Rosen claims about Moroccans and their inability to express themselves without waiving their hands, unfortunately, is quite similar to the type of anti-Semitic caricatures of the mannerisms of Jews that one frequently encounters in European pre-modem literature.7
Methodologically, the least one can say is that in constructing the image of the "other," Rosen is well advised to show restraint, and sen sitivity so as to avoid unfortunate stereotypes. But Rosen's arguments are replete with other inexplicable methodological oversights, and puzzling exaggerations and inaccuracies. After Rosen makes the un fortunate comment about the hand-waving Moroccans, he goes on to explain that in the practice of Arab and Islamic law, the styles of speech by which testimony is shaped, and legal remedies are articu lated remain similar to the language people use in everyday life. In other words, according to Rosen, the language used in the practice of law in the Arab world is similar to the language used by lay people in their everyday activities. Rosen states that Arab and Islamic law pos sess "little of the strange formality or professionalized distortions found in some other systems of law." Rosen adds: "The result, then, is a legal system that remains relatively close to the terms and percep tions found in a host of other domains of social life" (p. 74). This, however, is a most curious claim. Any person who has read books on Islamic law in their original language is struck by the highly technical jargon that is quite distinct from the everyday language used in socie ties of the past or present. Furthermore, contrary to Rosen's claims, courts in urban centers in the Arab world are quite formal, and whether one examines briefs drafted by lawyers or judgments issued by courts, one is struck by the fact that the language used is very tech nical and generally incomprehensible to the laity. The fact that lawyers use a less technical language to examine or cross-examine witnesses on the stand does not mean that Arab courts lack formality. Good law yers, whether from the Arab world or the United States, tend to direct questions to witnesses in an accessible language so that they can draw out the facts. But Arab lawyers and judges, like most lawyers and judges in the world, write in a language that is very different from the language used to question a witness, and the law itself, which they im plement, is drafted in a language that is highly technical and profes-7. This anti-Semitic stereotype is portrayed in the movie Uprising (Warner Bros., 2001), a film about the Warsaw Ghetto revolt against the Nazis. Jurgen Stroop, a German propa ganda officer, interviews the chief Rabbi of Warsaw in the context of making a movie about Jews. The Rabbi starts speaking on film in a dignified and restrained manner, but the officer tells the Rabbi that something is missing -the Rabbi is not acting sufficiently Jewish. In order to look authentically Jewish, the officer tells the Rabbi that he should wave his hands as he speaks. The Rabbi has no choice but to comply, and he starts speaking while mechani cally, and somewhat comically, waving his hands.
sionalized. Rosen, however, is keen on portraying Islamic and Arab law as somehow different from modern legal systems,8 and although he does not say as much, it is fair to conclude that he tends to perceive Islamic and Arab law as quite primitive.9 For example, Rosen con cludes that Islamic and Arab law do not have appellate levels of re view, and even more, they do not need such appellate levels because of the indeterminacy of law and reality among Arabs. Appellate courts are not needed because they would yield definitive results that would tend to ignore a range of localized realities and practices. This is not acceptable, Rosen posits, because Arabs and Muslims wish to live in ambivalence. According to Rosen, appellate courts would not sit well with Arab and Islamic legal cultures (pp. 35, 182) . This argument, however, is entirely inaccurate. Apparently, Rosen is not aware of the complex Islamic pre-modern jurisprudence that regulated the jurisdic tion of courts, including which issues are susceptible to being over turned by a higher court and which are not.10 Apparently, Rosen is also not aware that most Arab countries have developed fairly sophis ticated rules of procedure that regulate which types of cases can be appealed and where, and most Arab countries have appellate courts including a supreme court.11 Perhaps, Rosen believes that the appel-8. Throughout his book, Rosen uses the expression "Arab law" without explaining what he exactly nieans by this. It is fair to say that French and Islamic laws, to varying degrees, have influenced most legal systems in Arabic-speaking countries. Furthermore, certain legal scholars, such as Sanhuri, Shehata, and al-' Awa, have influenced a large number of legal sys tems in the Arab world. However, the expression "Arab law" does not adequately express the tremendous varieties of legal culture and practice in the Arab world. For pedagogical reasons, I am using the expression "Arab law" in this Essay, but I note that it is more accu rate to speak in terms of Arab laws and Arab legal systems -in the plural rather than the singular. While I do believe that there are common doctrines and institutions that unify the legal systems of most Arabic speaking countries, one must also be cognizant of the fact that there are many differences as well. Another matter that raises similar issues as the one dealt with above is Rosen's insistence that Islamic and Arab legal practice relies on direct testimony and oral evidence. Rosen spends a considerable amount of time exaggerating the role oral evidence plays in Islamic and Arab legal systems and, like many Orientalists, he obsesses about the role of written documents in Islamic law, insisting that written documents have an elusive role to play in court adjudications (p. 5). In Rosen's estimation, Arabs consider oral evidence to be more reliable than written evidence, and he implies that circumstantial evidence has a problematic position in Islamic/Arab culture. In evaluating the role of written documents, Rosen heavily relies on an assessment of the function played by public notaries in Morocco. He intimates that reli ance on public notaries is an indication that Arabs distrust written documents. Rosen, however, notes that "a great many of the litigants" treated written documents as "near-sacred objects to be protected at all costs" (p. 101). Putting all the pieces together, I am not sure what conclusions Rosen wants to reach. Our own legal system in the United States frequently relies on public notaries, but does this necessarily mean that Americans do not trust written documents? Furthermore, why isn't the fact that some Arabs guard their written documents with their lives an indication of the importance and reliability of written documents in Arab culture? In many ways, the reliance on oral evi dence is a common characteristic of a pre-modem legal system, and Rosen does seem keen on giving the impression that Arabs and Muslims live in some bazaar-like pre-modem limbo. But it is strange that Rosen persistently ignores any evidence that disturbs his world view of Arabs, Muslims, and Islamic law. For example, Rosen states: "it can be argued that a move has begun in Islamic law toward more use of circumstantial evidence, concepts of probability, and the notion that things -and not only sentient beings -can cause things to hap pen" (p. 43). This statement is startling in its grudging acceptance of the possibility that Arabs ·and Muslims might actually be employing legal methods that have been known to the common law and civil law systems for at least two hundred years. Furthermore, Rosen's claim is entirely inaccurate because circumstantial evidence and notions of probability have been employed in Islamic law and in Arab legal sys tems for centuries. In Islamic law and the laws of most Arab countries, a qarina (pl. qara'in) (legal evidence) could be oral or written, and it could be direct or indirect, and a qarina rarely leads to certainty (yaqin), but it does lead to a probability of belief (ghalabat al-zann). In Islamic law, the standard of proof varies depending on the legal is sue. Murder or adultery, for instance, can be proven only if all doubt is negated (bi in'idam al-shubha), while contractual matters require only a preponderance of belief (bi ghalabat al-zann). Similarly, circumstan tial evidence is admissible in every Arab jurisdiction, including Saudi Arabia, and there are varying standards of proof depending on the le gal issue at hand.12
The legal world that Rosen describes is odd and unfamiliar for any specialist on Islamic law,13 or for any person who has practiced law in urban centers in the Arab world. If Rosen accurately understands the legal practices that he documents in his book, all one can say is that his empirical sample, whether it is the town of Sefrou or some other place, is a strange one indeed. But aside from the empirical sample problem, Rosen's knowledge of Islamic law is highly suspect. As part of his ar gument that, for Arabs and Muslims, truth is highly subjective and constantly shifting, he states: "In Islam, from its earliest times, it is clear that proof depends far more on who it is that says a thing is so than on what may be determined independent of who asserts it."14 12. 13. One of the most startling remarks that Rosen makes about Islamic law occurs at the very beginning of his book. Rosen claims that Islamic law is a field where "abstract theologi cal speculations" take place, and that Islamic legal texts address, among other things, ques tions of theology. P. ix. This claim betrays a basic Jack of familiarity with the classical and modem Islamic legal literature. In reality, theology, leave alone the speculative type, is con spicuously absent from Islamic legal treatises. Theological questions are dealt with in a dif ferent genre of works dedicated to 'aqa'id (Islamic beliefs). Unfortunately, one suspects that Rosen has not read primary Islamic legal sources, and that his impressions about Islamic law are based on secondary sources, and on his social encounters in a few courts in a few Arabic speaking countries.
14. P. 180. Rosen also claims that there is a system of "person classification" in Islamic law. By knowing a person's origins, Muslims believe that they can know a person's charac teristic relationships and actions. P. 51. As a matter of socio-cultural practice, this might be true in certain parts of the Arab world. But it is unsupported in Islamic law. Many pre modem Muslim jurists did accept certain classifications; such as, free, slave, indentured, Muslim, protected non-Muslim, unprotected non-Muslim, man, and woman. These classifica tions made a difference in identifying appropriate legal remedies, so for example, some ju rists argued that personal injury compensation is higher for men than women. But the vast majority of Muslim jurists never claimed that the genealogy, social background, or class has any relevance to ascertaining a person's characteristic relationships or actions. If Rosen's judges are making social and economic origin determinative in their assessment of credibility or in ascertaining the facts of the case, they are acting in clear violation of the rules of evi dence in Islamic law.
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Rosen does not cite any sources for this rather peculiar claim. At a minimum, his claim flies in the face of the persistent Qur'anic empha sis on truthful testimony, and on speaking the truth even if it be against one's family, clan, or beloved ones. But Rosen goes beyond generalizing about hadd-type crimes. He claims that strict liability applies to major religious infractions, that in cases of murder, the intent of the offender is imputed predominantly from the weapon employed, and that animals, children, and even in fants are strictly liable for injuries that they cause (pp. 76-79) . For all this, Rosen does not inform the reader who exactly it is that says that Islamic law is a system that pays no attention to an actor's 18. P. 77. Throughout his book, Rosen mentions that Arab judges claim that they can tell whether a witness is being truthful by looking into their eyes and at their facial expres sions. See, e.g., pp. 13-14, 23, 77, 118. Rosen does not explain whether he considers this to be a unique aspect of Arab legal practices. He does seem to think, however, that this judicial approach to the assessment of credibility somehow supports his claims about contingency and negotiability in Islamic and Arab legal culture, and the ultimate otherness and exotic ness of Arabs and Muslims. Interestingly, however, Rosen ignores the fact that common law and civil law judges make the exact same claim about their ability to assess the credibility of witnesses. In my experience, Anglo-American and French judges often claim that they can assess credibility by looking directly into a witness's eyes, and assessing their gestures and facial expressions.
[Vol. 100:1421 state of mind. He doe� not cite any original sources, but relies exclu sively on a few Orientalist sources written in the first half of the past century. In reality, Rosen is simply wrong. Muslim jurists do not im pose strict liability in the case of hadd crimes, and the state of mind of the offender is crucial for establishing liability. The majority of jurists hold that a mistaken belief as to facts, for instance, in believing that you are married to someone in a case of adultery, or believing that you have a right to the property in the . case of theft, acts as a shubha (an element of doubt) that mitigates punishment, or negates liability alto gether.19 Furthermore, in torts, as opposed to crimes, the idea of strict liability is premised on the argument that as between the competing interests, the victim of an injury ought to be compensated. In other words, this is a position of social welfare, not a negation of state of mind analysis. In all cases, Muslim jurists were extremely reluctant to hold a person liable for injuries that resulted from unforeseeable con sequences. Compensation was often hinged on foreseeability, which in turn, involved a careful evaluation of the subjective state of mind of the offending party.20 As to Rosen's odd claim that an infant is to be held personally liable for injuries, this is simply without foundation. No classical jurist held that an infant is personally liable for injury. Furthermore, children are not liable for their intentional criminal acts because children are considered incapable of forming the requisite mental state for the commission of a crime.21 Even Rosen's claim about whether in a case of murder the weapon used may establish the offender's state of mind is unwarranted. What Rosen ignores is that what Muslim jurists referred to as the "instrument of death (adat al qatl)" position, was fundamentally an argument about foreseeability. The issue was, if a person strikes another with a sword or any other 19. AL-KHASSAF, KITAB ADAB AL-QADI, supra note 6, at 731-37; AL-SADR AL SHAHID, 4 KIT AB SHARH ADAB AL-QADI, supra note 6, at 475-80.
20. For example, the medieval Hanafi jurist al-Marghinani writes of one who digs a hole, sewer, or gutter in a public street, or a street that he knows or should know is utilized by people: if a passerby falls in the hole or sewer, and is hurt, the digger must pay compensa tion to the injured party if the injury was to be expected. On the other hand, if the hole or sewer was dug in a deserted or private pathway, the digger is not liable if the injury was not expected. In other words, in effect, this means that the actions of the digger are the proxi similar deadly weapon, can such a person claim that the death of the victim was not foreseeable? The Hanafi school of law, in particular, held that the use of some instruments or weapons establish a rebutta ble presumption that the inj ury or death was intentional. The other schools of thought maintained that the use of particular instruments is a factor to be considered, but since the ultimate issue that must be de termined is the offender's state of mind, no presumption ought to fol low because of the use of a particular instrument by the accused.22 Rosen interprets much of Islamic law in a fashion that does not comport with any textual source. For example, one of the main sources of Islamic law is rule by analogy (qiyas). According to Rosen, qiyas is framed in terms of repercussions instead of antecedent pre cepts. In using qiyas, a judge "will compare outcomes rather than prior rules, results rather than causes" (p. 32). Rather inconsistently, Rosen remarks that judges in the Arab world note that no two cases are ex actly the same, and therefore, strict adherence to precedent is inap propriate. Rosen does not ascribe this practice to the influence of the French legal system upon many Arab countries, but implies that this practice is indicative of something traditionally Islamic.23 Rosen con tends that the reason Arab judges do not treat any two cases the same is because judges, in deciding cases, try to validate the present status of people, and maintain people on a course in which they can continue the process of social negotiation without any significant disruption (p. 23). This is why, according to Rosen, rights or justice, as an abstract theory or concept, do not matter in Arab and Islamic law. Rosen, however, misunderstands the role of qiyas in Islamic law, and to the extent that he claims that this juristic method influences Muslim judges, his analysis is inaccurate. Contrary to what Rosen claims, qiyas does not turn on repercussions, outcomes, or results. In fact, a rule based on qiyas or analogy turns solely on what is described as the op erative cause of the law ('ilia). According to the method of qiyas, if two cases involve the same material causes or principles, the ruling in a prior case can be extended to a new case. The classic example of this is that if date wine is prohibited because it is an intoxicant, then grape 23. The French Civil law system has had a profound influence on many countries in the Arab world, and in this legal system, there is a limited use of stare decisis. In this legal sys tem, the facts of each case are considered unique and specific, and so no two cases can be the same.
[Vol. 100:1421 wine can also be prohibited for the same cause.24 Rosen seems to have a very poor handle over the whole logic and practice of qiyas. At one point, Rosen characterizes sound analogy as ta'wil (p. 52 n. 38). This again is one of those inexplicable claims for which Rosen cites no source. Ta'wil means interpretations or exegesis -it is the employ ment of hermeneutic methodologies in an attempt to understand the text. Sound analogy would be described as qiyas sahih, not ta 'wil.
The source of Rosen's understanding of qiyas is a mystery, but Rosen does not seem to find any particular need to cite sources for many of his claims about the Islamic tradition. At one point, he claims, without citation, that the Prophet Muhammad stated that there is no distinction among believers except as to knowledge, and he uses this to support his argument that Arabs are preoccupied with knowing the status and relationships of individuals (pp. 70, 143) . In twenty years of researching the Islamic tradition, I have never encountered this pur ported statement that he attributes to the Prophet, and my efforts to locate this report yielded nothing. The closest that is found in the Is lamic tradition, is a statement in which the Prophet asserts that the only distinction among the believers is piety (taqwa).25 Furthermore, Rosen is often hesitant and unsure when it comes to Islamic legal his tory. In one notable example, Rosen repeats the Orientalist fiction re garding the closing of the doors of ijtihad in Islamic legal history.26 Rosen cites Waet Hallaq on this issue, which is rather strange because of all Western scholars, no one has done as much to dispel this fiction as Hallaq.27 Nevertheless, in one part of his book, consistent with Hallaq's analysis, Rosen argues that the doors of ijtihad were never closed at all. Yet, in other parts of the book he contends that the doors of ijtihad were left aj ar by the incorporation of custom and social prac tice into Islamic law (pp. 32, 52, 97) . In reality, the doors of ijtihad were never closed either formally or informally, but the incorporation of social practices and custom into Islamic law has remained a prob lematic issue. Most of Rosen's research was conducted in Morocco, which follows the Maliki school of law. Of the various Islamic schools, Rosen, himself, claims that language and textual sources are im portant for understanding Islamic and Arab culture. He asserts the following: "To see how some of these elements evince themselves in the Arabo-Islamic worldview it is, as is so often the case when dealing with this part of the world, essential to grasp some of the terms in volved in Arabic itself" (p. 134). Rosen analyzes the meaning of sev eral legal terms in Islamic law in order to demonstrate the "Arabo Islamic worldview." Because of space constraints, it is not possible for me to review all of Rosen's linguistic analysis, but the least one can say about his arguments concerning. Arabic terminology is that it is strained. I will focus on two demonstrative examples. Rosen analyzes the meaning of the word aman. Aman could mean a state of safety or security, or trust, and is often used in Islamic law to mean the granting of assurances of safe conduct to a merchant, traveler, or diplomat.29 Rosen, however, takes this meaning to a qifferent direction. For him, aman tends to convey "a sense of personal attachment between those who trust one another rather than confidence in institutions, office holders, or even one's own knowledge or abilities' ' (p. 135) . Rosen also analyzes the meaning of the word wathiqa, which means to trust and rely on someone. Wa thiqa is derived from the root word thiqa, (Vol. 100:1421 which means trust.30 Rosen, however, argues that, since one variant of this word could mean to bind or fetter, terms of trust in the Arab world reveal an important part of the "Arabo-Islamic worldview." Trust or reliance is a creative act of mutual limitation in which people limit and fetter each other in this constant process of social negotiation (p. 135). The meanings of both these words, however, do not support Rosen's claims. There is no support for Rosen's contention that aman implies trust in one another that does not include institutions or gov ernments. In fact, in Islamic legal usage, aman does connote a state of safety or security that is offered and guaranteed by the government or state. In addition, wathiqa is quite different from awthaqa. Wathiqa means to trust -for instance, to trust in God (al-thiqa fi'llah). It does not imply that there is a state of mutual limitation between God and human beings. Awthaqa means to tie up or bind, and it does not entail any degree of trust or mutual reliance.
Rosen does not engage in these linguistic speculations for their own sake. He has a much larger point, one that is quite problematic. Rosen argues that Arabs and Muslims have a distinctive sense of time and space. Engaging in various linguistic exercises, Rosen claims that Arabs and Muslims have no concept of public property or space in "ei ther a spatial or metaphoric sense" (pp. 137, 198) . All property and space is either privately owned or belongs . to God. Even more, Arabs and Muslims do not have a sense of chronological time. Elaborating upon this point, Rosen states:
But Westerners who approach the Quran or listen to Arabs relating popular stories or accounts often find the recitation confusing and dis jointed. Instead of moving in a fairly clear chronological order the story often jumps about in time: Instead of a clear picture of events being given by referring to the sequence of their occurrence, central characters are referred to in numerous situations whose precise chronological order is not necessarily given. (p. 71) This, of course, is consistent with Rosen's argument that all truth, facts, and rights for Arabs are situational and relative. Nevertheless, Rosen is able to make these claims only by ignoring a substantial amount of contrary evidence. In fact, the idea of public property (am wal 'amma) and public utilities or roads (turuq 'amma and manafi' 'amma) is found in all classical Islamic law books, in modern Arab legislation, and in all Arab social practices. Rosen's inaccurate claim is offensive precisely because it ignores the cumulative textual evidence of centuries, and even the contemporary Arab experience with social ism and the nationalization of private properties into publicly owned properties. Both Islamic law and modern Arab law have numerous 30. IBN MANZUR, 10 LISAN AL-' ARAB, supra note 29, at 371. discourses on the ownership and regulation of public properties.31 In addition, Rosen has not read a single pre-modern or modern book of history written in the Arabic speaking world. Pre-modern history books especially were often organized chronologically and not the matically. And, even a book of literature such as A Thousand and One Nights proceeds in chronological order as Shehrazade burns the mid night oil one night, and one parable at a time.
The main problem with Rosen's analysis is that it is the quintessen tial example of result-oriented scholarship. Rosen cites anything that he believes supports his caricatured image of Arabs and Muslims, without bothering with any contrary evidence or even the specifics of the examples he uses. On various occasions, Rosen likens Arab and Muslim culture, and even Islamic jurisprudence to a chess game in which all moves have implications for the overall picture, and in which the possibilities of movement and strategy are endless. He even goes so far as to claim that chess, as opposed to games of chance, became "the consummate Muslim game" (pp. 82, 186). But Rosen does not address the fact that even this part of his worldview of Arabs and Muslims is problematic because many Muslim jurists have prohibited the playing of chess.32 In addition, the most popular game in the Middle East and the one played most often in coffee houses is back gammon, not chess. Another telling example of Rosen's methodology is a part of his book in which he takes the liberty of contrasting West ern and Arab notions of justice. Rosen's point is that while Westerners speak of rights and entitlements, Arabs speak of contexts and relation- (Vol. 100:1421 ships. Rosen then asserts that nothing captures the Islamic notion of justice with greater clarity and poignancy than a tale told by the Ber bers of the high Atlas mountains of Morocco about how Justice and Injustice came to be separated for all time (p. 173). Interestingly, how ever, the Berbers, although Muslim, are not Arab. But this hardly seems to matter because in Rosen's mind Moroccans, Muslims, Berbers, Arabs, Islamic law, and everything in between are all lumped into one indistinct mass. An example derived from one is good enough for the other.
Considering the sweeping and often demeaning generalizations that Rosen makes about Arabs and Muslims, I can only speculate as to how people would react if the same generalizations were made about other people and their legal systems. One can only speculate about Rosen's motivations and purposes. The end result of Rosen's analysis, regardless of how much he tries to escape to abstractions in order to obfuscate his conclusions, Arabs, and indeed Muslims, end up a peo ple without notions of truth, justice, rights, public space, or even time. It is notable that throughout his book, Rosen pleads benevolent un derstanding. He consistently chides other scholars for being Eurocen tric, and insists that Arabs and Muslims must be understood on their own terms. He even defends what he believes to be the Arab and Muslim position on the Salman Rushdie Affair and the Satanic Verses -in effect, arguing that their position makes sense within their own cultural paradigms (pp. 189-94) . He is also understanding towards what can only be described as the authoritarian practices of some Arab governments. He sees this authoritarianism as consistent with Arab notions of etiquette, treason, and public shame. According to Rosen, in Muslim and Arab culture, criticism of public officials cannot be conducted through public channels or venues because. this would violate Arab etiquette.33 But Rosen ignores that many Arabs and 33. P. 194. On this point, Rosen cites an incident in which shortly after the Gulf War, a few hundred jurists in Saudi Arabia criticized the King's foreign policies in an open letter published in a newspaper. The Saudi government reprimanded the jurists, reminding them that it is inappropriate to criticize the King publicly, and that proper advice should be given privately and personally. Rosen seems to think that the Saudi government's response repre sented an authentic Arab norm, and that the jurists who published the open letter acted in a way that is less authentically Arab. In reality, the Saudi government was trying simply to protect itself and perpetuate its infamously despotic rule. For example, there were several reports that the Saudi goverrtffi ent did not simply reprimand the jurists, but arrested, tor tured, or executed most of them. Interestingly, various rulers in Islamic history have tried to use the same exact argument used by the Saudi government. They tried to censure public criticism by claiming that such criticism is somehow un-Islamic, and demanding that all criti cism should be private and personal. Even more interesting, however, is the fact that the maj ority of Muslim jurists did not accept this self-serving argument. In fact, there is a well established tradition in Islam of public and visible criticism of rulers. Jurists who do so and, as a result, suffer persecution are remembered as heroes and martyrs. Muslims refused to support the death sentence against Rushdie, and even defended Rushdie's right to say whatever he pleased.34 He also ignores Arab and Muslim aspirations for democracy, and the fact that many would be more than happy to publicly criticize government offi cials if they did not have to contend with the realities of persecution, imprisonment, and torture. Considering Rosen's clear tendency to read the evidence selec tively, and in effect to affirm the image of the Arab and Muslim as shifty, unprincipled, and simply different, we should ask, once again, what motivates Rosen? Why does Ro sen insist on the largely Orien talist paradigm of the exotic bazaar to understand Arabs and Muslims? In perhaps one very telling part of his book, Rosen advises that in attempting to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, and making peace, Westerners must understand the Arabs' particular sense of jus tice. Arabs can only seek to make peace "against [a] tangled, ambiva lent, refractory, and transcendent feeling of justice," which shapes their expectations and hopes. Rosen goes on to say: "it behooves us, in our own quest for mutual cooperation and forbearance, to compre hend the Arabs' felt sense of justice and render it the full measure of our sympathy and understanding" (p. 175). In general, this might be good advice. But, an Arab Muslim, like myself, cannot escape the con clusion that Rosen's forbearance and benevolence is condescending. More importantly, it is condescending towards an image of Arabs, Muslims, and their jurisprudence that has much more to do with the state of mind of the author than with anything in reality. Rosen's Arab is a foggy character who is exotic and distant, and who is difficult to understand or predict because he is constantly negotiating, shifting, and forming. Ultimately, Rosen's Arab is difficult to trust or deal with except with condescending forbearance, like the deceiving and con niving merchant in the bazaar who tells you one thing and means an other. This, I suspect is Rosen's reality. But, then again, I might be wrong because, according to Rosen's paradigm, as an Arab, I really have no objective sense of reality. My reality is as shifting and chang ing as the highly situated pieces in a good game of chess. 
